Globalizing torture: CIA SECRET DETENTION AND EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We also have to work, through, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective. — U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, September 16, 2001 [1]
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) commenced a secret detention program under which suspected
terrorists were held in CIA prisons, also known as “black sites,” outside the United
States, where they were subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques” that
involved torture and other abuse. At about the same time, the CIA gained expansive
authority to engage in “extraordinary rendition,” defined here as the transfer—
without legal process—of a detainee to the custody of a foreign government for
purposes of detention and interrogation.2 Both the secret detention program and
the extraordinary rendition program were highly classified, conducted outside
the United States, and designed to place detainee interrogations beyond the
reach of the law. Torture was a hallmark of both. The two programs entailed the
abduction and disappearance of detainees and their extra-legal transfer on secret
flights to undisclosed locations around the world, followed by their incommunicado
detention, interrogation, torture, and abuse. The administration of President George
W. Bush embraced the “dark side,” a new paradigm for countering terrorism with
little regard for the constraints of domestic and international law.
Today, more than a decade after September 11, there is no doubt that high-
ranking Bush administration officials bear responsibility for authorizing human
rights violations associated with secret detention and extraordinary rendition,
and the impunity that they have enjoyed to date remains a matter of significant
concern. But responsibility for these violations does not end with the United
States. Secret detention and extraordinary rendition operations, designed to be
conducted outside the United States under cover of secrecy, could not have been
implemented without the active participation of foreign governments. These
governments too must be held accountable.
However, to date, the full scale and scope of foreign government participation—as
well as the number of victims—remains unknown, largely because of the extreme
secrecy maintained by the United States and its partner governments. The U.S.
government has refused to publicly and meaningfully acknowledge its involvement
in any particular case of extraordinary rendition or disclose the locations of secret
overseas CIA detention facilities. While President Bush acknowledged that the
CIA had secretly detained about 100 prisoners, the U.S. government has only
identified 16 “high value detainees” as individuals who were secretly held in
CIA detention prior to being transferred to U.S. Defense Department custody in
Guantánamo Bay. The United States also has refused to disclose the identities of
the foreign governments that participated in secret detention or extraordinary
rendition, and few of these governments have admitted to their roles.
This report provides for the first time the number of known victims of secret detention
and extraordinary rendition operations and the number of governments that were
complicit. Based on credible public sources and information provided by reputable
human rights organizations, this report is the most comprehensive catalogue of the
treatment of 136 individuals reportedly subjected to these operations. There may
be many more such individuals, but the total number will remain unknown until the
United States and its partners make this information publicly available.
The report also shows that as many as 54 foreign governments reportedly
participated in these operations in various ways, including by hosting CIA prisons on
their territories; detaining, interrogating, torturing, and abusing individuals; assisting
in the capture and transport of detainees; permitting the use of domestic airspace
and airports for secret flights transporting detainees; providing intelligence leading
to the secret detention and extraordinary rendition of individuals; and interrogating
individuals who were secretly being held in the custody of other governments.
Foreign governments also failed to protect detainees from secret detention and
extraordinary rendition on their territories and to conduct effective investigations
into agencies and officials who participated in these operations. The 54 governments
identified in this report span the continents of Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and
North America, and include: Afghanistan3, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong,4 Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Yemen,
and Zimbabwe.5
By engaging in torture and other abuses associated with secret detention and
extraordinary rendition, the U.S. government violated domestic and international
law, thereby diminishing its moral standing and eroding support for its
counterterrorism efforts worldwide as these abuses came to light. By enlisting
the participation of dozens of foreign governments in these violations, the United
States further undermined longstanding human rights protections enshrined in
international law—including, in particular, the norm against torture. As this report
shows, responsibility for this damage does not lie solely with the United States,
but also with the numerous foreign governments without whose participation
secret detention and extraordinary rendition operations could not have been
carried out. By participating in these operations, these governments too violated
domestic and international laws and further undermined the norm against torture.
Torture is not only illegal and immoral, but also ineffective for producing reliable
intelligence. Indeed, numerous professional U.S. interrogators have confirmed
that torture does not produce reliable intelligence, and that rapport-building
techniques are far more effective at eliciting such intelligence. A telling example
of the disastrous consequences of extraordinary rendition operations can be
seen in the case of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, documented in this report. After being
extraordinarily rendered by the United States to Egypt in 2002, al-Libi, under
threat of torture at the hands of Egyptian officials, fabricated information relating
to Iraq’s provision of chemical and biological weapons training to Al Qaeda. In
2003, then Secretary of State Colin Powell relied on this fabricated information in
his speech to the United Nations that made the case for war against Iraq.
In December 2012, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to approve
a comprehensive report on CIA detention and interrogation. Although the report is
classified, and was not publicly available at the time of this writing, the committee
chairman, Senator Dianne Feinstein, stated that she and a majority of the committee
believed that the creation of long-term, clandestine black sites and the use of so-called
enhanced interrogation techniques were “terrible mistakes.” She added that the report
would “settle the debate once and for all over whether our nation should ever employ
coercive interrogation techniques such as those detailed in the report.”
Despite the scale of torture and other human rights violations associated with secret
detention and extraordinary rendition operations, the United States and most of
its partner governments have failed to conduct effective investigations into secret
detention and extraordinary rendition. The U.S. Justice Department’s investigation
into detainee abuse was limited to ill-treatment that went beyond what its Office
of Legal Counsel had previously authorized, and concluded without bringing any
criminal charges, despite ample evidence of CIA torture and abuse. Italy is the
only country where a court has criminally convicted officials for their involvement in
extraordinary rendition operations. Canada is the only country to issue an apology
to an extraordinary rendition victim, Maher Arar, who was extraordinarily rendered
to, and tortured in, Syria. Only three countries in addition to Canada—Sweden,
Australia, and the United Kingdom—have issued compensation to extraordinary
rendition victims, the latter two in the context of confidential settlements that
sought to avoid litigation relating to the associated human rights violations.
Moreover, it appears that the Obama administration did not end extraordinary
rendition, choosing to rely on anti-torture diplomatic assurances from recipient
countries and post-transfer monitoring of detainee treatment. As demonstrated
in the cases of Maher Arar, who was tortured in Syria, and Ahmed Agiza and
Muhammed al-Zery, who were tortured in Egypt, diplomatic assurances and post-
transfer monitoring are not effective safeguards against torture. Soon after taking
office in 2009, President Obama did issue an executive order that disavowed
torture, ordered the closure of secret CIA detention facilities, and established
an interagency task force to review interrogation and transfer policies and issue
recommendations on “the practices of transferring individuals to other nations.”
But the executive order did not repudiate extraordinary rendition, and was
crafted to preserve the CIA’s authority to detain terrorist suspects on a short-
term transitory basis prior to rendering them to another country for interrogation
or trial. Moreover, the interagency task force report, which was issued in 2009,
continues to be withheld from the public. The administration also continues to
withhold documents relating to CIA Office of Inspector General investigations
into extraordinary rendition and secret detention.
In addition, recent reports of secret detention by or with the involvement of the CIA
or other U.S. agencies remain a source of significant concern. These include reports
of a secret prison in Somalia run with CIA involvement, secret Defense Department
detention facilities in Afghanistan where detainees were abused, and the two-
month long secret detention of a terrorist suspect aboard a U.S. Navy ship.
Despite the efforts of the United States and its partner governments to withhold
the truth about past and ongoing abuses, information relating to these abuses
will continue to find its way into the public domain. At the same time, while U.S.
courts have closed their doors to victims of secret detention and extraordinary
rendition operations, legal challenges to foreign government participation in these
operations are being heard in courts around the world. Maher Arar’s U.S. lawsuit
was dismissed on grounds that judicial intervention was inappropriate in a case
that raised sensitive national security and foreign policy questions. Similarly, U.S.
courts dismissed on state secrets grounds Khaled El-Masri’s lawsuit challenging
his abduction, torture, and secret detention by the CIA. In contrast, the European
Court of Human Rights recently held that Macedonia’s participation in that
operation violated El-Masri’s rights under the European Convention on Human
Rights, and that his ill-treatment by the CIA amounted to torture. In addition,
Italy’s highest court recently upheld the convictions of U.S. and Italian officials for
their role in the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar to Egypt. Moreover, at the
time of this writing, other legal challenges to secret detention and extraordinary
rendition are pending before the European Court of Human Rights against Poland,
Lithuania, Romania, and Italy; against Djibouti before the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights; and against domestic authorities or officials in Egypt,
Hong Kong, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
In the face of this trend, the time has come for the United States and its partner
governments to own up to their responsibility for secret detention and extraordinary
rendition operations. If they do not seize this opportunity, chances are that the truth
will emerge by other means to embarrass them. The taint of torture associated with
secret detention and extraordinary rendition operations will continue to cling to
the United States and its partner governments as long as they fail to air the truth
and hold their officials accountable. The impunity currently enjoyed by responsible
parties also paves the way for future abuses in counterterrorism operations.
There can be no doubt that in today’s world, intergovernmental cooperation is
necessary for combating terrorism. But such cooperation must be effected in a
manner that is consistent with the rule of law. As recognized in the Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006,
“effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not
conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing.” Consistent with
this principle, it is incumbent on the United States and its partner governments to
repudiate secret detention and extraordinary rendition, secure accountability for
human rights violations associated with these operations, and ensure that future
counterterrorism operations do not violate human rights standards.
[…]
CONCLUSION
The human rights violations associated with CIA secret detention and extraordinary
rendition operations were significant and systemic. But the United States and most
of its partner governments have yet to meaningfully acknowledge their role in per-
petrating these violations or provide appropriate redress to the victims. Moreover,
the United States has still not repudiated the unlawful practice of extraordinary
rendition. Indeed, President Obama’s January 2009 executive order directing the
closure of CIA detention facilities did not apply to facilities used for short term, tran-
sitiory detention, and was reportedly crafted to preserve the CIA’s authority to de-
tain terrorist suspects prior to rendering them to another country for interrogation
or trial. In addition, recent reports of secret detention by or with the involvement of
the CIA or other U.S. agencies remain a source of significant concern.
Despite the efforts of the United States and its partner governments to withhold
information relating to secret detention and extraordinary rendition, further public
revelations on this subject, such as those documented in this report, are likely to
continue. At the same time, although U.S. courts have largely closed their doors
to victims of secret detention and extraordinary rendition, legal challenges to
these practices are filtering through courts around the world. The European Court
of Human Rights recently held that Macedonia’s participation in Khaled El-Masri’s
abduction, torture, and secret detention violated the European Convention on
Human Rights, and that his treatment by the CIA amounted to torture. Italy’s
Court of Cassation upheld the convictions of U.S. and Italian officials for their role
in the extraordinary rendition of Abu Omar to Egypt. As of the time of this writing,
other legal challenges to secret detention and extraordinary rendition operations
are pending against Italy, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania before the European
Court of Human Rights; against Djibouti before the African Commission on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights; and against domestic authorities or officials in Egypt,
Hong Kong, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Especially in the face of these developments, the time has come for the United
States and its partner governments to admit to the truth of their involvement
in secret detention and extraordinary rendition, repudiate these practices, and
conduct effective investigations directed at holding officials accountable. These
measures are essential not only for ensuring that torture and other human rights
violations have no place in future counterterrorism operations, but also for ensur-
ing the effectiveness of these operations. Indeed, as recognized in the Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
2006, “effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights
are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing.”
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